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1. Introduction
Given the importance of communications in today's world, its spread in developing economies is
critical for their development. Emergence of standards reduces market and technological
uncertainty and lays the foundation for market creation. This in turn enhances the diffusion of
communication technologies partly through economies of scale advantages. Due to these network
externalities, adoption of standards is very important for developing countries. A variety of
approaches to standard adoption exist. Which approach is most suitable for a country like India?
What are the critical issues that are relevant for standards adoption? Can we come up with some
broad parameters of a framework that can be used to analyse various issues relating to setting of
communication standards?
Standardisation has become increasingly important with the rise in cross-fertilisation between
information technology (IT) and other technologies, especially in communications.  Large-scale
use of PCs by the corporate sector, government departments and households has created new
needs to link the PCs within networks.  This is essentially because the consumers are increasingly
demanding compatibility and inter-operability.  At the same time growing diversity of satellite
and other telecom equipment and of software make standardisation processes very complex and
difficult.  Moreover, rapid changes in IT related technologies has put the standardisation system
under pressure: while standards have become urgent to create markets, consensus among
interested groups is more difficult to achieve due to uncertainties and the magnitude of vested
interests.
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Under these circumstances, strategic implications of IT standardisation are huge because
standards can determine the growth potential of individual firms, affect the competitive advantage
of nations and even development of technologies and their diffusion.  It is recognised that market
mechanisms do not provide adequate assurance that the best technology will prevail or that an
obsolete one be replaced at the right time.
Implementation of communication networks, with competing networks poses a challenge in
choosing an appropriate standard. The standard selection is not a straightforward decision of
choosing the standard promising the best performance. When standards compete, the best
possible standard may lose out in the market. Customers locked into losing standard may face the
situation of slow or no upgradation. The critical choice is between remaining standard neutral and
specifying a standard to be deployed. Each policy decision has its advantages and disadvantages.
For example, one of the advantages of implementing a single standard is market creation and the
associated faster technology diffusion. At the same time, there exists a possibility of being
stranded with a standard that might lose out in the standard war (technological lock-in) or with an
inefficient standard (regulatory failure). In the same vein, some of the advantages of remaining
standard neutral are that the market determines the standard and there is no regulatory
inefficiency in the standard setting. However, standard neutrality may mean that an inefficient
standard may win the battle (market failure). Neutrality may also lead to problems arising from
the refusal by network operators to make their networks compatible to some applications. Similar
problems may exist in implementing a single standard if owners of intellectual property (IP) that
goes into making a standard may refuse to license it to others.
Given the advantages and disadvantages for each policy decision, it becomes imperative to follow
a dynamic strategy towards standard adoption. The standard setting also has to take into account
the interdependence of various technological domains so that it can facilitate innovation in the
ICT related technologies. This paper will explore these questions in the context of the experience
of standard setting elsewhere in the world and identify key issues and options for India. The rest
of the paper is divided into 4 sections. The next section briefly discusses the general approaches
to standard setting and highlights the role of standards in network industries. This is followed, in
section 3, by a discussion on standard setting approaches adopted by Europe, the United States
and South Korea in the context of mobile standards. Section 4 pools together the key issues
related to the standard setting process and identifies policy options for India, once again in the3
context of cellular standards. The final section broadens the scope of the discussion and raises
some general issues with respect of standardisation processes and IT in India.
2. Standards and Networks
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Standards can be broadly defined as an agreed upon set of specifications that define a particular
product or that allow products to inter-operate. Standards can be achieved through market
selection, a regulatory process of the government or a voluntary consensus process.
2.1 Standard Setting Processes
When the market operates effectively, appropriate standards are expected to emerge at the right
time through the process of supply and demand. Producers will agree on the best standard in the
face of competition from other suppliers and the demand of users. Producers may press for the
adoption of their own standards or select strategically from among other competing standards,
evaluating each in terms of its potential impact on costs of production, profitability and market
share. Users on the other hand may demand standards that reduce purchasing prices, improve
utility and are easily integrated with other products and systems. The market may, however, fail
when appropriate (efficient) standards do not emerge in a timely fashion. Some kinds of
technologies are subject to greater market failures then others. For example, networked
technologies-such as information and communication technologies-often have large installed
bases, making it particularly costly for users to shift to new, more technologically advanced
standard. Thus, they may fail to adopt the socially optimal standard, due to sunk costs and the
technology or standard "lock-in".  At the same time, these technologies also exhibit increasing
returns to adoption, a situation that occurs when the benefits to the user of a technology increase
with the number of users. Under these circumstances, the wrong standard might be chosen due to
excess momentum. Not wanting to be left out of the network when a major adopter moves to new
standard, users may rush too quickly to jump on the bandwagon.
Regulatory Standards are established by legitimate government authorities and mandated from
the top. If the market standards are established by exchange relationships, regulatory standards
are based on authority relationships. The government for a number of reasons might set standards.
For example, if the market structure is non-competitive, economic outcomes may be inefficient.
Some market decisions might fail to incorporate or account for environmental, safety and other
social externalities. Regulatory standards play a crucial role when standards are needed in a short4
span of time, because the decisions based on authority can be made and implemented fast.  To
create standards governments use a variety of mechanisms.
Standards can also be set through organisational processes that reduce transaction costs and
facilitate information exchange and negotiation among key players. Such a process known as
Voluntary Consensus Process can provide for better co-ordination than the market when levels of
uncertainty are high, when there are frequent recurring exchange activities among the parties
and/or when information exchange is complex. Organisations may participate in the voluntary
standards development process for a number of reasons. They may, for example, want to
influence the development of standards, or may wish to keep abreast of technological
developments. The incentive to participate in such exercises is likely to vary by industries. In
industries such as telecommunications, for example, the incentive to participate in standards
setting is likely to be high. If communications systems fail to work together, there can be no
services to sell.
2.2  Network Externalities, Economies of Scale and Scope
As mentioned, in the case of networked technologies the standards become very important. To
understand the importance of networked technologies, it is essential to understand he concepts of
“network externalities” and the economies of scale and scope
3.
There are many products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good. There are several possible sources
of these externalities.  The consumption externalities may be generated through a direct physical
effect of the number of purchasers on the utility of the product. The utility that a consumer
derives from purchasing a telephone, for example, clearly depends on the number of other
households or businesses that have joined the telephone network. These network externalities are
present for other communications technologies as well.  Significant diffusion of specific products
and/or technologies can result in the development of a wider variety of related products and
technologies.  Consumers can also hope to get better post purchase services.
There may be other indirect effects that give rise to consumption externalities. The central feature
of the market that determines the scope of the relevant network is whether the products of
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different firms may be used together. For communications networks, the question is one of
whether consumers using one firm's facilities can contact consumers who subscribe to the
services of other firms. If two firms’ systems are inter-linked or compatible then the aggregate
number of subscribers to the two systems constitutes the network. If the systems are
incompatible, such as cable and telephone, then the size of an individual system is the proper
network measure for users of that system.  These can also be seen as ‘consumer side scale and
scope economies (Morris, 2002).
Due to network externalities co-existence of incompatible products in network markets is often
unstable, with a single winning standard dominating the market. Given demand side economies of
scale and scope, expectations about the ultimate size of a network are crucial. Buyers who join
what turns out to be a losing network must either switch, which may be costly, or else content
themselves with smaller network externalities than those associated with the winner. Since
buyers’ purchase decisions are therefore strongly influenced by their forecasts of future sales,
there can be large rewards to affecting these expectations. And these expectations can be
generated strategically by firms or by governments by mandating/preferring certain standards.
In these circumstances, victory need not go to a better or cheaper product: An inferior product
may be able to defeat a superior one if it is widely expected to do so. For example, the initial
success of MS-DOS is usually attributed not to any technical superiority, but to the fact IBM
supported it.
Just as communications or IT technologies (hardware as well as software) exhibit large consumer
side scale and scope economies, supply side economies are also widespread.  This is particularly
so for software, where the marginal cost of producing an additional unit is extremely low (Morris,
2002).  Thus, if standards creation can facilitate rapid growth of the market, both supply and
demand side economies can be reaped and costs can decline significantly.  But, as mentioned,
consumers can get locked in to specific technologies.  Add to this the learning by doing effects
and ‘sunk’ investments of producers and the lock-in becomes complete. Consequently, specific
technologies and standards can get locked-in for a long time.
Thus, the main problem with standards is that once a standard is established it may be very
difficult to modify or replace.  The standards gain value by the sheer size of the installed base.
Therefore, superior technology (standards) may not be able to enter the market as network effects
may carry over from one generation of the entrenched technology to the next, defining the future6
path of development of the market.  This path dependence creates entry barriers for new
technologies.
While standardisation has lock-in related problems, multiple standards can have their own
problems.  Fragmentation in the market can lead to small (but viable) poorly supported standards.
Network economies are not reaped and users locked into standards having small installed-based
get orphaned not having the benefit of new complements to their standards. Besides the costs can
remain high, as economies of scale and scope are not reaped.  The key advantage of multiple
standards is that the market retains variety.  Retention of the variety is important because better
standards may lose out to an inferior standard in the standardisation process.  Given high
technological uncertainties some competition among standards is desirable.  However, the issue
of the trade off between loss of variety and fragmentation is difficult to resolve.
3.  Standard Setting Processes: Some Experiences
The earlier section has highlighted the importance for standard setting. Many countries have
recognised this importance and have given it a significant policy focus. This section discusses
some cases of setting cellular standards to highlight key issues.  These cases involve elements of
a variety of standards setting processes, market driven, regulatory as well as consensual.
3.1  The European Experience: Political, Economic and Technology Imperatives
In the early 1980s, European governments recognised the problems associated with a plethora of
standards.  Given the small markets for customer and network equipment, the costs for the same
were high, as economies of scale could not be achieved.  Besides, the use of mobile equipment
and access to network services were limited to national boundaries, making it difficult for the
travelling population.  Thus, network externalities were not being reaped.  In 1982, the
Conference of European Posts and Telegraphs (CEPT), an inter-governmental organisation that
comprised national telecommunications administrations of European countries, formed a study
group to develop a pan-European public land mobile cellular telephone system.  It was mandated
that the new system achieve (1) spectrum efficiency, (2) good speech quality, (3) low mobile and
base station costs, (4) ability to support new services and facilities, and (5) compatibility with
integrated services digital network.  Subsequently, European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) got involved in this exercise which resulted in a digital standard called Global
System for Mobile standard called Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) that was7
commercialised in 1991. The process of creating this standard brought out a variety of issues that
are relevant for developing countries.
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The European governments realised that localised solutions for mobile communications did not
make long term economic sense.  Given the high R&D costs for operators and manufacturers it
was essential to exploit economies of scale afforded by global market penetration.  Home market
revenue simply would not justify sustained investment in a specific technology. While the
governments recognised that protection of their national industries may constrain the standard
setting process,
5 the national interests could not be ignored.  For example, the choice between
narrow band and broad band alternatives brought to the fore the conflicting interests of
Scandinavian (Ericsson/Nokia and Franco-German firms (SEL, AEG & Alcatel).  The deadlock
would have derailed the standardisation process if the European Commission had not worked
hard to develop a political consensus and persuaded member states to reserve a frequency band
(900 MHz) for the pan-European digital standard.  This was critical as interoperability depends
not only on the use of the same digital technology but also on the system operation in the same
frequency bands.  The formation of ETSI by the Commission further facilitated the
standardisation process.
Eventually, a narrow-band architecture was used for the proposed GSM standard but several
features or Franco-German proposal were also incorporated.  In fact, the standard was derived
from eight candidate proposals submitted by the European Industry Consortia.  This ‘basket’
standard provided just returns to the opposing camps as the initial competitive advantages were in
GSM subsystems, not in the entire system. Thus, the narrow band architecture could have given
an initial small advantage to Nokia and Ericsson over their French and German counterparts in
some subsystems of the GSM network, no manufacturer commanded hegemonic advantage.
Besides, given the monopolies in their domestic telecom markets French and German
governments were free to order GSM equipment from the manufacturers of their choice (e.g.,
Alcatel, Siemens and SEL), ensuring that these firms would get a fair share of the new market.
The only requirement was that EU members use European standards in public procurements.
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Although GSM is a communication system designed by Europeans for deployment in Europe, the
system has been exported to countries all over the world.  In 2001, the number of GSM
subscribers was 564.6 million, while Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) the closest
competitor technology had a subscriber base of only 99.8 million.
6  The dramatic success of GSM
has been attributed to the early rollout of the technology and the tremendous economies of scale
GSM enjoyed due to the single standard in Europe.  The dramatic success of GSM can also be
partly attributed to the entry of non-European equipment manufacturers, notably Motorola, which
got entrenched into this market through the ownership of many essential patents necessary for the
implementation of GSM.  Subsequently, Lucent and Nortel also entered the fray.   The interests
of a wide spectrum of manufacturers made the market competitive, which combined with
economies of scale led to higher penetration with lower costs.
3.2  US Experience: A Case of Market Determination
In 1987 the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began the transition from Analog
(AMPS) to digital technology by declaring that the cellular operators can employ any technology
as long as it does not interfere with the operations of other operators.  In 1988, Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) came up with a set of User Performance
Requirements (UPR) for the new cellular technologies.  These included (1) a ten fold increase in
system capacity compared to the analog systems, (2) dual mode (AMPS/digital) capability, (3)
new data feature capabilities (e.g. fax, short message service), (4) early availability of equipment,
and (5) standard for high quality of service.
The actual task of setting the standard was left to the Telecommunications Industry Association
(TIA), the industry body of the equipment manufacturers.  Responding to the UPR, after
considerable debate, the TIA adopted IS-54, a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) standard.
Despite apparent shortcomings of IS-54 standard vis-à-vis the UPR it was formalised in 1991 and
the equipment was tested the same year. Three months after the adoption of this standard,
Qualcomm proposed another standard based on CDMA.  In 1993, the Qualcomm’s CDMA based
mobile standard was modified and adopted by the TIA and the first system based on CDMA was
tested in 1995 and commercial operation began in 1996.  The IS-54 standard was also modified to
a standard named IS-136 and released in 1996.9
A few aspects of the US standardising system are worth highlighting.  The FCC believes in
market determined standards. Therefore, the TIA approved both CDMA and TDMA proposals,
subject to the satisfaction of performance requirements.  The spectrum auction winners can
deploy wireless networks with technology of their choice including GSM.  Since there is no
obligation to have US earned revenue, US and European firms can participate equally, Finally,
the voting process in the TIA is open to all members with each member having only one vote.
The votes are weighted at ETSI. Ceteris paribus, the policy of standards neutrality makes the US
market more contestable. The large market size combined with absence of local manufacturing
requirements probably allows various standards to co-exist without losing out on economies of
scale.
3.3  The South Korean Experience: The Role of Industrial Policy
7
When the Korean firms and the Korean government considered development of the Cellular
phone system, the analog system (AMPS) was dominant in the USA and the GSM system was
dominant in the Europe. The Korean Ministry for Information and Telecommunications focused
on the CDMA system that was emerging in the US due to the efforts of Qualcomm. The Korean
government was interested in CDMA mainly because of its efficiency in frequency utilisation and
higher quality and security in voice transmission. Korea concentrated on CDMA when there was
great uncertainty over CDMA. Korean government also overruled the reservations expressed by
telephone service providers and system manufacturers like Korea Telecom, Samsung and LG.
The Ministry along with Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) decided
to go along with the CDMA. One of the main reasons reported to be of main consideration was
that if Korea just followed already established TDMA (GSM), the gap between Korea and its
forerunners would never be reduced and, thus catching-up would take even longer. Although the
first CDMA test system was available only in 1995, the Korean government had declared the
CDMA system development as a national project in 1989. In 1991, the contract to introduce the
core technology and also to develop the system was signed with Qualcomm. In 1993 the Ministry
declared CDMA as the national standard. As of early 2000 Korea had more than 6 million
CDMA subscribers. The success of this technology strategy is evident from the fact that Korean
companies have 15-20 % of the US cellular handset market.
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3.4  The 3G Standardisation Process
The standard creation process for the third generation (3G) wireless communication technologies
under the auspices of International Telecom Union (ITU) has brought to fore a variety of issues
similar to the ones discussed above.  Ten proposals were submitted, including two by TIA and
ETSI.  Obviously, the proposals by TIA and ETSI proposed standards closer to the dominant
standards in the two regions, CDMA in the US and GSM (WCDMA) in Europe.  The proposals
also led to a bitter feud between Ericsson and Qualcomm regarding CDMA patents, the latter
accusing the former of infringement.  The strategic intent of the firms was similar to that
observed at the time of GSM standardisation process where many companies, especially
Motorola used their patent portfolios to their strategic advantage.
To push the essential elements of their proposals ETSI and TIA initiated alliances.
8  The idea was
to evolve a consensus around a set of standards and harmonise their proposals.  Interestingly,
representatives from many countries were present in the two partnership projects, Japan and
South Korea being most noteworthy.  The ‘dual’ memberships reflected the fact that many
countries were not clear which standard would emerge as the winner.  ITU finally recommended
five standards.  These included W-CDMA (also known as Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System - UMTS) standards recommended by the ETSI sponsored group (3GPP), CDMA2000
recommended by the TIA group (3GPP2), TDWCDMA, a standard proposed by China but close
to the ETSI proposal and two other non-CDMA standards.
The choice of standards made by various countries is interesting.  The European Union has
mandated the use of WCDMA and two other standards that are compatible with the existing GSM
networks.  In Japan, where a unique second-generation standard was used, the dominant players
(e.g., NTT DoCoMo) decided to adopt WCDMA to capture the world market of user-producer
equipment.  At the same time they are trying to protect the domestic market. Some smaller rivals
(e.g., KDDI) however, opted for CDMA2000. South Korea, which had invested heavily into the
CDMA and related technologies, has decided to move into GSM compatible (WCDMA)
standards.  Despite the heavy cost in the form of incompatibility with the existing infrastructure,
Korean firms expect a larger and faster growing user base in GSM compatible technologies.  In
any case, once the new investments are made, they would be well positioned to deal with both
types of standards.  While the Japanese and the Korean behaviour seems to be guided by the huge
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market for terminals and hand held devices that is likely to be generated by 3G networks, China
has opted for a separate standard to benefit from a huge GSM market at home.  The Chinese
probably wish to leverage the scale economies in the home market to become an important player
in the equipment and hand held markets at a subsequent stage. They have used the same strategy
for several other electronic products.
4.  Policy Options for India
When the Indian government opened mobile services for private participation in 1992, the policy
makers were significantly influenced by the spread of the GSM in Europe.  Consequently, the
tender conditions specified that the digital mobile services should fully conform to GSM
standards.  The services were also to conform to system inter-working and interface with the
existing Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).  However, the introduction of other
standards was taken cognisance of when the tenders for the fourth license were issued in 2001.
By then the tenders had become technology neutral.  In spite of the shift to technology neutrality,
it was unlikely that the license winners would adopt any standard other than GSM.  This was so
because all the operators had already sunk in investments in GSM networks.  Besides, they would
like to provide roaming facilities between circles they currently operate in and the circles they are
to start operations.  This facility would not be possible if different standards are selected.
Given the fact that most mobile operators have sunk in their investments in the second-generation
(2G) GSM networks, what options India has vis-à-vis 3G standards?  India seems to have lost out
on the manufacturing of telecom equipment and the hand set market. Nor are we in a position to
enter the components market in any significant manner. Therefore, strategies adopted by the
players in Europe, US, Japan, South Korea and China to penetrate these markets is not very
relevant for India.  In fact, the bidding points allocated for the use of domestic equipment has
been low about 3 per cent) in the recent telecom related bidding processes. This was presumably
due to the inability of the Indian manufacturers to deliver the latest technologies. (Singh, 1999).
This low weightage brought to an end the saga of domestic equipment manufacturing that had
resulted in many controversies during the 1980s and delayed the entry of foreign equipment
manufacturers.
9 Unlike China, India has failed to become a large base telecom equipment
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manufacturing. There is still a potential to attract equipment/hand set manufacturing firms to
India to develop a manufacturing base. Equipment orders for the cellular industry were estimated
to be worth $ 10 billion for the 1995-2005 period (Singh, 1999: 186). While the roll out has been
not as rapid as expected, India by no means is a small market.   The current trends do not suggest
any major improvement on the manufacturing front. Even if we are able to attract manufacturing
related FDI in telecom or become part of the global production networks of telecom equipment
manufacturing, it does not seem desirable that we should get tied to specific telecom standards.
While we need to make efforts to become part of the global production networks, given the
technological uncertainties and other concerns, discussed below, it may be useful for India to
keep its options open vis-à-vis telecom equipment manufacturing. A technologically diversified
manufacturing base may be more useful for both hardware and software industries as Indian firms
can be part of alliances to make software (embedded and others) for telecom equipment following
different standards. A policy of neutral telecom standards makes sense at this stage from the
perspective of broad-based learning through alliances and networks. A large and growing telecom
market in India can support such a strategy without compromising economies of scale.
The other strategic concern identified in the earlier discussion related to intellectual property
rights (IPRs) that are relevant or essential for specific standards like the GSM or CDMA.  Unlike
Motorola or Qualcomm, no Indian firm owns intellectual property that is important for specific
standards.
Given these conditions India’s standards policy cannot be strategically based on the interests of
the existing domestic manufacturers or IP holders.  There is one segment, however, that can
potentially benefit from the policy vis-à-vis telecommunications standards.  And that is the IT
sector.  Many Indian IT firms can actively participate in the solutions business.  In fact, some of
them have been actively participating in the ITU standard setting fora including those initiated by
European and American interests to get exposure and penetrate the market for solutions.
Telecom software market is large and growing and this can be an important area for growth for
the Indian IT industry. Moreover, the price of mobile telephony has been declining, and the
population of mobile phones is expected to cross the PC population by 2004 (NASSCOM, 2002).
If standards policy facilitates further reduction of these prices and enhances usage of this low cost
access devices, R&D in areas of embedded software and mobile commerce can take place in the
                                                                                                                                                                            
liberalisation initiatives introduced in 1992 that five large foreign equity owned joint ventures by AT&T,
Siemens, Alcatel, Fujitsu and Ericsson were set-up. Subsequently, 100 per cent ownership was allowed on13
country.  This in turn may enable the software firms in India to tap these rapidly growing
segments in the international markets. Given the scope of for working with different standards,
Indian firms may even be able to get IPRs in important subsystems of different networks through
developments in the solutions business.
10 Adherence to a single standard may reduce learning
possibilities for the IT firms and may eventually result in some kind of a lock-in.
One could argue that persistence with GSM standards, instead of shifting to technology neutrality
would have reduced future uncertainty and enlarged the market faster.  However, the supremacy
of GSM and GSM compatible standards like WCDMA has not yet been established.  Some
comparisons, in fact, show that CDMA technologies may be better (Ramadesikan and Basant,
2001).  Given this, and the fact that technologies are changing very rapidly, possibility of
regulatory failures is high.  Therefore, technology neutrality seems justified.  Technology
neutrality vis-à-vis mobile standards (especially 3G) also seem desirable because of a variety of
reasons.
11
Large volumes of GSM have been a major driver for declining costs of GSM related equipment.
Countries like Japan and South Korea that stayed away from GSM compatible technologies will
be present in the WCDMA market.  There is, therefore, a possibility of WCDMA equipment and
handset costs being lower than the other competing technologies.  This is expected to benefit the
existing GSM operators and enhance their user base.  However, recent trends world-wide show
that the transition from GSM to WCDMA has been rather slow. In fact, CDMA 2000 is selling
more handsets than WCDMA. This trend is expected to continue for another five years giving
economies of scale advantages to CDMA2000 instead of WCDMA. Even in Japan, where the
dominant player had opted for WCDMA, the user base was only 127,400 in July 2002 as against
the user base of 1.64 million of CDMA2000.
12
Moreover, India is not entirely locked into the GSM legacy.  The Wireless in Local Loop (WLL)
operators who have deployed CDMA base for the local loop can eventually graduate to 3G
standards by using CDMA based advance technologies.  Thus, the existence of WLL CDMA
                                                                                                                                                                            
a case by case basis.
10 I understand that something of this kind is already happening on a small scale and might increase with
larger scales of operation.
11 Ramadesikan and Basant  (2001) provide technical and other details.
12 The data on the CDMA2000 and WCDMA roll out reported in this paragraph is based on a press briefing
by Irwin Jacobs, the Chief Executive of Qualcomm (Reuters, September 4, 2002). Qualcomm not only14
provides an opportunity for CDMA2000 to be introduced in the country.  Effectively, therefore,
both GSM and non-GSM based operators can compete to provide 3G services.  This will enhance
contestability in the market and avoid lock-in.
13 Given the possibilities of “entry” into 3G services
and the fact the superiority of either the two major standards is yet to be established, technology
neutrality seems desirable.  Besides, a new operator interested in rolling out 3G networks and
services with other technologies is also possible in this scenario. If technological superiority and
lower costs due to competition of CDMA based equipment does not emerge as a viable option,
operators will automatically discard it.
Finally, it can also be argued that it is too early for India to start worrying about 3G standards, as
we are yet to fully utilise the potential of the second-generation technology. Since applications for
3G that require high data speeds will take some to develop the need for 3G may not occur in India
for sometime.  Besides, it is possible to enhance data speeds of the existing second-generation
networks with some modifications.
5.  Some Concluding Observations
Several characteristics of effective regulation have been have been identified in the literature.
These include independence, accountability, transparency, fairness, simplicity & clarity, speed,
consistency etc. In general, the regulation relating to telecommunications standards also needs to
satisfy these criteria. In addition, any regulation in the telecommunications sector also has to deal
with technological convergence in this sector. Given the natural monopoly characteristics of
telecommunications (especially local fixed) networks, ensuring effective competition in this
segment has been an important regulatory problem. Since inter-network competition is difficult to
obtain, the focus has been on fair access and reasonable interconnection arrangements. The
emerging convergence in telecommunications technology may change this condition.
Telecommunications networks that were highly differentiated in what services they could deliver
(e.g. broadcasting v/s voice technology) are now somewhat equivalent in terms of services they
can deliver to customers. Different ways of providing the same type of services and the provision
of totally new type of services are developing rapidly. These are changing the rules of
competition; not only the competition across networks is emerging with various networks
becoming close substitutes, competition in service provision is also on the rise. Broadly,
technological changes are leading to growing demand (especially of internet services) and
                                                                                                                                                                            
owns most of the patents for the CDMA technology standard, it also collects royalties from the usage of
rival WCDMA technology.15
innovations are significantly modifying the structural features of telecom industry with emerging
convergence across fixed and mobile and across IT and media sectors.
What implications do these developments have for the policy vis-à-vis standards? The final
impact of the technology convergence is still largely unknown. Meanwhile, these developments
cut across the existing set of regulatory rules and regulations challenging the conventional
definitions of telecom industry. In such a scenario, a heavy handed and inconsistent regulation
across different delivery mechanisms, arbitrary service classifications, and narrow choices of
standards can distort markets. If the regulation is unnecessarily restrictive, it may also result in
economic inefficiency with customers failing to get the full benefit of technological convergence.
While convergence is bringing different types of network closer to equivalence, it is not making
them the same. At least, not as yet. The particular points of bottleneck (e.g. scarce resources like
radio spectrum), incumbency dominance, natural monopoly in some elements in the local loop or
the particular way customers are locked into specific network by their purchase of equipment will
continue to vary due to economic and technical reasons. Broadly, issues relating to network
interconnection will remain very significant in terms of policy due to persistence of (a) fixed
costs of a subscriber being connected to a network (both for fixed and mobile networks); and (b)
network externalities between subscribers. In other words, anti-competitive behaviour in terms of
setting excessive access and inter-connection charges will remain a reality and will have to be
dealt with. The issue of standards would also have to be seen in this broader context. Insistence
on narrow standards may create possibilities of anti-competitive situations. Given the
technological uncertainties and convergence possibilities it can also result in significant
regulatory failure.
The problems associated with market and government failures have led to a rise in interest in
functional standards. These include standards such as ‘Open System Interconnection, which
define performances to be achieved at different levels (or layers) of technological systems, but
retain important degrees of freedom in deciding how the standards will be met’ (OECD, 1991: 7-
8). The implementation of open standards, however, remains difficult, as with rapid technological
change two machines that satisfy functional standards may not be able to satisfy the need for
inter-operability and compatibility (OECD, 1991: 8).  These two conditions, may therefore be an
essential part of the acceptable standards, apart from performance requirements so that the
                                                                                                                                                                            
13 The recent developments in the telecom market in India provide further support to this argument.16
consumers can keep pace with the evolving technologies.  One essential feature for the
standardisation processes needs to be that one technology is able to interact with another. The
Indian government and firms should participate in the standard creating procedures at the ITU
and other fora to insist on more open standards and get exposure and learning for market
entry/penetration in the solutions market.
The key need for the Indian economy is that the telecom infrastructure should grow rapidly.  This
requires among other things rapid decline in the cost of equipment.   Recent reductions in the
customs duties on the telecom equipment have already resulted in lower prices; the tariffs
declined from over 40 per cent in 1997-98 to 5-15 per cent on various types of telecom equipment
in 2001-02.  In general, the prices of telecom equipment have been falling very rapidly in recent
years.
14 Given the developments referred to above, a neutral standards policy with insistence of
inter-operability and certain performance requirements is unlikely to create an upward pressure
on price in the future.  Costs are going to fall for all equipment using the widely used standards.
A rapid increase in telecom infrastructure and a decline in costs of mobile and other types of
telephony will create new opportunities for IT firms in the solutions and embedded software
business. E-governance can be given a boost, as more people would have access to low cost
Internet access devices. A large base would also boost the development of localised content,
which can further boost usage and revenues from telephony (NASSCOM, 2002: 85). This would
not only lead to further price reductions but also create potential for growth and learning for the
IT firms. Moreover, widespread use of mobile telephony may also facilitate the growth of the IT
Enabled Services (ITES) market.  With a drastic fall in equipment prices, employees can be given
access to mobile phones in case trouble shooting is required.  This would enhance the quality of
service and provide flexibility to ITES workers, especially women.
15This is very important in the
current context. Employment in the ITES markets was estimated to be of the order of 106,200 in
2001-02 with a revenue stream of Rs 6,960 crores. The forecast is that this market can provide
employment to about 1,100,000 persons in 2008 and generate revenues worth Rs 81,000 crores
(NASSCOM, 2002: 41). For this to happen, maintenance of high quality of service would be
critical. And access through mobile phones or other wireless devices can go a long way in
ensuring quality in this industry.
                                                          
14 For example, high-end routers, which were priced at US $ 120,000 per OC-48, are projected to cost $
20,000 in 2003. Throughput costs per Gbps has declined from US $ 210 in 1994 to US $ 4 in 2001
(NASSCOM, 2002: 84).
15 I am thankful to Rekha Jain for pointing this out to me.17
Recent controversy around provision of mobile services through WLL has created market
uncertainty for GSM service providers and equipment manufacturers.  But it has also added to
contestability in the market.  Apparently, a better allocation of spectrum can partly ameliorate the
concerns of the GSM operators.
16   While this needs to be explored, it highlights a general issue
vis-à-vis standardisation.  It has been found that dominant/formal standards obtain better terms
(especially in Europe) in the allocation of radio frequency spectrum, network operator licensing
practices, terminal equipment type approval rules and procurement rules.  Thus formal (globally
dominant) standards have a much higher chances of success.  This leads to a strategic increase in
the licensing fees for the essential IPRs.  (Bekkers et al, 2002).  This in turn enhances costs of
equipment.  The Indian policy makers should avoid such tendencies and also lobby for removal of
such practices in other countries through international fora.  After all, lower costs of equipment
are what we are interested in.
Finally, there are problems specific to our own economy, or other similar economies.  These
problems may not be important enough for global R&D.  Usually, market players are unwilling to
experiment or deliberately search for information.  Search for technology options other than
those, which are easily accessible, and which are known to be profitable elsewhere, is typically
not done.  If policy makers can facilitate and support such experimentation, especially for
problems that are typical of one’s economy, more information will get generated and choices of
standards may be more rational.  If such experiments succeed, local entities may be able to create
“standards” for specialised problems and commercialise it in the domestic and other economies
with similar problems.
17  Such experiments also have a potential of creating IPRs for domestic
entities in small subsystems of a network. The Web flourished into a new medium on the basis of
freely accessible communications standards of the Internet. More recently the wireless data
technology, Wi-Fi has been made possible because the US federal government decided a few
years ago to set aside a strip of unlicensed radio frequencies and allowed everyone who followed
a simple set of rules to share among themselves (Markoff, 2002). Today, Wi-Fi has opened up a
variety of options to reach inaccessible areas with a multitude of applications.
I understand that researchers at the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Kanpur are working on
the Wi-Fi technologies to tackle the "last mile" and other problems that face countries like India.
                                                          
16 Thanks are due to Partha Mukhopadhyay for pointing this out to me.
17 This idea emerged from a discussion with Partha Mukhopadhyay.18
They may be able to come up with very interesting solutions as IIT, Chennai did with their
CorDECT technology. Our standards and spectrum allocation policies need to facilitate all such
experiments and more to build domestic capabilities in these domains.
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